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Buddhadharma : Summer 2019
REVIEW | PAMELA KYLE CROSSLEY 117 possible, controlling—identification of Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama incarna tions. This remains a high priority for the current government of China, which has interfered with the current Dalai Lama’s 1995 identification of the new Panchen Lama and substituted its own. The govern ment intends to also identify the next Dalai Lama, perhaps even before the death of the current Dalai Lama. Its right to do so, it insists, derives from Qing hegemony over Tibet and Qing control over the recogni tion of reincarnated teachers. The most famous institution in that hegemony is the subject of Max Oidt mann’s superb monograph, Forging the Golden Urn: The Qing Empire and the Pol- itics of Reincarnation in Tibet (Columbia, 2018). It begins with the initiation of inter vention by the Qing empire in the selection of reincarnated teachers in Tibet, including the highest ranking hierarchs of both Tibet and Mongolia. There had been an inva sion by Nepal, the opportunity for which the Qing emperor blamed on squabbling among Tibetan elites. In 1792, to improve divination and curb corruption in Lhasa caused by a few lineages’ monopolization of recognized reincarnations, the Qianlong emperor decided to intervene. He issued a set of regulations regarding future appoint ments of all reincarnated teachers; the plans were reported to be endorsed by the Eighth Dalai Lama, though he had retired from active administration. As Oidtmann points out, the practice of drawing names from an urn to fill government appoint ments was known in China from Ming times; the Qing, however, were now tak ing it into the supernatural dimension. The ritual involved twin urns—one in Beijing, one in Lhasa. The one in Lhasa contained the nametags and would be shaken before It was the Qing empire that had the most complex and rapidly evolving rela tionship with historical Tibet. This was made possible by the fact that as the Qing were establishing themselves as prospec tive emperors of China at Beijing in 1644, the Dalai Lama and his supporters were establishing the Dalai Lama’s role as the ruler of Tibet. In precisely the same period, western Mongols created the Khoshut khanate (a political entity ruled by a khan or khaghan), which until its destruction by the Dzunghars in 1717 claimed a good deal of Tibetan territory and maintained an uneasy coexistence with the govern ment of the Dalai Lama. In 1653 the Dalai Lama visited Bei jing, and from that point the Qing used the political status of the Dalai Lama in Tibet as a platform for asserting increasing dominance. From the late 1600s, develop ment of Qing hegemony in Tibet advanced in tandem with Qing campaigns to destroy the Dzunghar khanate (which also con trolled part of Tibet) and consolidate con trol over Mongolia. A military garrison was established at Lhasa in 1718; in 1720, the Qing appointed their commissioner at Lhasa; in 1724, they turned the Tibetan province of Amdo into the Qing prov ince of Qinghai, and shortly after coopted the new incarnation lineage, the Panchen Lamas; in the 1750s they violently sup pressed uprising among the Tibetans; beginning in 1789, they worked to repel an invasion from Nepal; and in 1794, Qing envoys to Tibet were ordered not to pros trate themselves before the Dalai Lama. As Qing ideological and strategic inter ests in Tibet converged over the late seven teenth and eighteenth centuries, the venue of Qing interference in Tibetan political affairs turned upon influencing—and if